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Abstract
Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market, this
paper examines the effect of price regulations on a multi-unit uniform
price auction. General bid caps reduce the maximum price below the
bid cap, but also the minimum potential market price below the cap.
A bid cap only for the larger firms does not guarantee a market price
below the cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for relatively small
firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium
prices above the marginal costs. With a general bid floor this happens
only with considerably larger bid floors.
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1 Introduction
This study aims at deriving in a very simple framework how different sorts
of price regulations change the equilibrium price in a multi-unit uniform
price auction. The choice of the framework as well as the different types of
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price regulations are motivated by similar price regulations in the New York
Installed Capacity Market (NYICAP) which will be explained in more detail
in the following section 2.
Multi-unit uniform price auctions are often used in electricity markets
to determine market prices.1 In a typical day-ahead wholesale market this
usually means that providers of electricity bid the price quantity combina-
tions into the market that reflect their willingness to provide electricity to
the market at a particular hour of the next day. These providers are mainly
electricity generating firms but this could also be retailers who bought more
electricity on future markets for that particular hour than their customers
most likely demand or pure traders. The demand side of the market could
be represented by the system operator who confronts the aggregated sup-
ply schedules with a total demand forecast of a particular hour. It could,
however, also be an aggregated demand schedule that the system operator
constructs from price quantity bids representing the willingness to buy of,
again electricity retail firms, large consumers of electricity, electricity generat-
ing firms which committed to higher production quantities in future markets
for that particular hour than they most likely can or want to deliver, or pure
traders.
Independent of the details of the particular market, the uniform price
auction always means that the system operator determines the price where
demand and supply is balanced. Finally all those providers who were willing
to sell quantities below this balancing price will sell these quantities. Those
providers who were willing to sell quantities exactly at the balancing price
are rationed such that supply and demand equals. What makes the multi-
unit auction a uniform price auction is that all traded quantities will be paid
the balancing price, no matter whether the particular supplier demanded it
or not. Those bidders who wanted to sell quantities at a higher price than
the balancing price cannot sell anything.
The NYICAP is not a market for actual electricity like the day-ahead
markets. It is an instrument introduced into the New York electricity mar-
ket in order to compensate power generating firms for a presumed lack of
incentives to invest in power generating capacity.
1The Electricity Pool in England and Wales before the reform in 2001, the Nord Pool
in Scandinavia, the Spanish wholesale market, as well as the NYISO and the ERCOT
market in the US are still or were organized as multi-unit uniform price auctions. See
Bergman et al. (1999), Crampes and Fabra (2005), Newbery (2005), Hortac¸su and Puller
(2008) and Zhang (2009).
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The suboptimal level of investments in electricity generating capacity is
usually motivated by the lack of informative scarcity signals implied in the
unregulated electricity prices on wholesale markets (see e.g. Joskow (2008)
and Cramton and Ockenfels (2012)) and might result in the missing money
problem. On the one hand demand in wholesale electricity markets is very
inelastic due to the fact that lots of consumers have contracts with their
retailers where prices are fixed for longer periods.2 On the other hand elec-
tricity cannot be stored which gives producers together with the inelasticity
of demand an enormous amount of market power in periods with very high
demand compared to the available capacity. In lots of electricity wholesale
markets, especially in the US, system operators have implemented relatively
low price caps which reduces the generators’ market power but also the po-
tential rents from capacity investments.
This paper does not aim at determining whether there is a missing money
problem in the New York electricity market3 nor, given that the problem
exists, whether the chosen instrument in New York is the most efficient one
to solve it with.4 Here the much more modest ambition is to figure out in
which way the outcome of a very simple multi-unit uniform price auction
that resembles the NYICAP mechanism is influenced by price caps and price
floors and how the effect is changed if the price cap or the price floor is only
applied to a subset of firms active in the market instead of to the whole group
of active firms. Motivated by the NYICAP example, this study focusses on a
price cap only for the firms with a relatively large generating capacity in the
market and a price floor only for the firms with a relatively small capacity
in the market.
The theoretical analysis rests on a very simple model of a multi-unit
uniform price auction without asymmetric information, first introduced by
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). The latter forms also the basis of the
mainly empirical contribution by Schwenen (2012). He shows that the NYI-
CAP data from 2006-2008 are in line with the conclusions of such an auction
model. The particular version of the model used here is a linear version of the
2This will only change if more consumers get access to smart meters and are exposed
to real-time prices.
3Le´autier (2011) argues, for example, that the reduction in investments in capacity due
to the missing money problem is small compared to the reduction in investments due to
the lack of competition in the electricity market.
4See for a discussion of alternative instruments, e.g. Finon and Pignon (2008) and
Cramton and Ockenfels (2012).
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more general one presented in Moreno and Ubeda (2006) and Ubeda (2004).
Section 3 introduces the main assumptions and identifies some characteristics
of the market outcome without any price regulation. Section 4 focusses on
the market outcome changes if the system operator either introduces general
price caps or price caps only for firms with relatively large capacities, or if
the system operator introduces general price floors or price floors only for
firms with relatively small capacities.
The main results are that general bid caps reduce the whole range of
equilibrium prices, also those below the cap, under usual circumstances. Only
if total capacities are either very small or very large there is no effect. If total
capacities are that small that the auctioneer always needs to balance supply
and demand because even the highest possible monopoly price on the residual
demand of the largest firm does not balance supply with demand, a price cap
does not reduce the market price. The same is true if total capacities are
very large and no firm’s capacity is need to satisfy even the highest demand.
Then the market price is zero and equal to the marginal cost of supplying
capacity on the market. If bid caps only apply to relative large firms with
large capacities their effect might be weakened if some intermediate firms are
not restricted and can still set their monopoly price on the residual demand
above the price cap. Sufficiently high general price floors applied to all firms
destroy pure strategy equilibria at the lower end of the price range. With
general bid floors the only remaining pure strategy equilibrium might be the
one where all firms bid at the floor. With selective bid floors this is not an
option. If, in this case, the floors are sufficiently high pure strategy equilibria
no longer exist.
The final conclusions focus on which changes we expect to observe on
the NYICAP market due to the changes of the regulation 2008. Multi-unit
uniform price auctions are also commonly used in treasury auctions (see e.g.
Brenner et al. (2009)), emission permit auctions (see e.g. Betz et al. (2010))
and even in order to place IPOs on financial markets (see e.g. Degeorge et al.
(2010)). Therefore the final section 5 also discusses whether the findings of
this study are relevant for these markets.
2 The New York Installed Capacity Market
The New York Installed Capacity Market (NYICAP) consists of three dif-
ferent regional markets for New York City, Long Island and the rest of the
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state of New York.5 For each of these markets the New York ISO conducts
auctions for installed capacity for each month of the capability year (starting
on May 1 and ending on April 30) at least 15 days before that year starts.
The final auction for each month called the spot market takes place at least
2 days before the start of the month. Each load serving entity in the state
of New York needs to buy capacity requirements that reflect the forecasted
peak-load demand of its customers plus a reserve. The load serving entities
can buy these requirements directly from electricity generators or via forward
auctions. However, if they are not covered 30 days before the month starts
the NYISO buys on behalf of them on the spot market.
The NYISO does so by constructing a demand curve for capacity that is
derived from the minimum installed capacity requirement that should ideally
be priced with a reference price.6 The latter should reflect the monthly going
forward cost of a peaking facility adapted to whether the month is in the
summer or the winter season. The minimum installed capacity requirement
is derived from the forecasted peak-load in the particular region of the New
York market in the considered capability year plus a reserve margin. The
going forward cost is the annualized estimated cost of a peaking unit minus
the estimated revenues that this peaking unit would generate on the New
York electricity markets. Two points define the linear part of the demand
for installed capacity in New York City: the reference point connecting the
reference price and the minimum installed capacity requirement and the point
connecting 112 % of the minimum installed capacity requirement with a price
of zero. Additionally a maximum price, resembling a price cap, cuts this
linear demand. The slope of the linear demand functions for the other regions
in the NYISO market is a bit flatter in absolute terms because the second
point combines 118 % of the minimum installed capacity and a price of zero,
but all regional NYICAP markets have a linear demand which is cut off at a
maximum price, meaning that the inverse demand becomes horizontal.
All generators who own generating capacity in the region can, after having
the characteristics of their capacity registered with the NYISO, bid their
capacity in the relevant regional NYICAP spot market as long as they have
5See the New York ISO’s homepage www.nyiso.com and for another but less detailed
summary of the rules Schwenen (2012).
6The argument for using a downward sloping function instead of a simple step function
that only relates to the reference price and the targeted capacity is that the capacity price
is less volatile over time when the load growth is uncertain. See, e.g. the simulation model
in Hobbs et al. (2007)
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not sold it already on a forward capacity market.7 The NYISO demands the
quantities according to the artificially constructed demand function minus
the quantities that the load serving entities had already procured until the
deadline via bilateral contracts or the forward market on behalf of the not yet
covered load serving entities. The NYISO determines the price of the spot
market via a uniform price auction. Those firms who sold capacities either
via bilateral trade agreements with the load serving entities or in a future
or the spot market for capacity are obliged to offer electricity equivalent to
these capacities in the wholesale market for electricity. They can, however,
always bid it at the highest possible price that is represented by the relevant
price cap on the wholesale market.
The NYISO installed capacity market is not unique in the US. Similar
set-ups also exist in other markets. Examples are the PJM and the New
England capacity market.8 They differ mainly by two characteristics, the
timing of the auction and the demand. The auctions take place much longer
in advance before the procured capacity needs to be offered on the wholesale
electricity market.9 In addition the demand function has more than one
linear segment with different slopes and therefore more kinks.
Besides the general price cap inherent in the NYICAP demand function
the NYISO had selective price cap regulations already before 2008. In 2008,
after observing that the spot market price for capacity coincided close to al-
ways with this price cap since 2006 (see also the empirical paper by Schwenen
(2012) on 2006-2008 data), the selective price caps were lowered, and selec-
tive price floors were newly introduced. In order to mitigate market power
suppliers who are considered to be pivotal must now offer their capacity at
a price not exceeding the default reference price. The latter is the reference
price corrected by a monthly calculated factor that relates 80% of the load
forecast to the the available capacity.10 A firm is pivotal if its capacity is
necessary for supplying the market with at least the reference quantity of
7These characteristics are for example typical maintenance times during a year where
the facility does not work, etc., in order to determine for how much capacity a certain
facility should count.
8See, e.g. Joskow (2008) and Hobbs et al. (2007). In Europe the UK is in the process
of implementing such a market (Department of Energy and Climate Change (2013)).
9This is supposed to provide more incentives to enter the market with new capacity.
10Pivotal firms can apply for getting another firm specific bidding cap if they can prove
to the ISO that their going forward costs deviate substantially from the average in the
market.
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capacity. The newly introduced price floor should prevent inefficient entry
and applies therefore only to new capacity in the market. The latter cannot
be supplied below 75% of the net cost of new entry, meaning the cost of a
peaking facility minus the revenues that can be realized with it in the new
market.11
In order to get a rough idea about how the market should respond to
these regulations the following analysis uses a very simple model of a multi-
unit uniform price auction with a certain linear demand as in the NYICAP
market and with given capacities of the participating firms. First the poten-
tial equilibria for given capacities without any price regulations are derived.
Then I introduce general price caps and identify the resulting changes in these
equilibria. Afterwards I consider a price cap only for firms above a particular
capacity and characterize again the resulting market equilibria. The latter
pretty much resembles the selective price caps that were tightened in the
NYICAP market after 2008. Then the paper analyzes a general price floor
to all firms in the market. The latter does not exist in the NYICAP market,
but later I compare it with a selective price floor that applies only to the
sub-group of firms with small capacities. The latter reflects the NYICAP
regulation, specifically targeted at new entrants, if new entrants enter on a
small scale.
3 The Model and the Equilibria without Price
Regulation
Consider a market with a set of N = 1, 2, . . . , n active firms with n > 2.
Each firm i ∈ N owns a certain amount of capacity Ki that it potentially
can supply on the capacity market. For now it is assumed that supplying
parts of the capacity or all of it on the market does not cause any costs.12
Assume that the firms are indexed such that Ki ≥ Ki+1. In addition define
11Again a firm that can prove that its entry cost substantially differs from this market
wide determined index number can apply for an individually determined bidding floor.
12In the NYICAP market the cost could be the obligation to supply the capacity on
the electricity wholesale market at least at the maximum possible price. As long as the
marginal cost of producing electricity with the considered capacity does not exceed the
price cap on the wholesale electricity market, withholding the capacity from the electricity
market cannot be more profitable than supplying the capacity at the price cap. Only if the
virtually calculated average running times used to calculate the maximum capacity of each
provider on the capacity market is misspecified and does not allow the generating firm to
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K¯ =
∑n
i=1Ki as the total capacity available, and K¯−i = K¯ −Ki as the total
capacity available if firm i does not supply its capacity Ki. Demand D(p)
for capacity is linear in the market price p with
D(p) = α− βp and α, β > 0. (1)
Each firm can submit a price bid bi ≥ 0 at or above which it is willing
to supply its total capacity Ki to the market.
13 The auctioneer sorts all
bids according to the demanded price in an ascending order and forms an
aggregate supply function. The equilibrium price is the price at which the
supply function equals the ex ante publicly known demand. All firms that
bid their capacity at a price below the equilibrium price sell their total ca-
pacity. Those, which bid above, sell nothing, whereas the marginal firm(s)
that bids(bid) the equilibrium price might be rationed in order to balance
supply and demand.14 The vector of all bids (b1, . . . , bn) needs to be a Nash
equilibrium in order to determine an equilibrium price in the auction.
Note that if the firms could split their total capacity into l ≥ 1 dis-
crete pieces for which they could demand different minimum prices to supply
them to the market, this would not change the potential equilibrium prices.15
Given that the demand is certain and common knowledge, then, whatever
the other firms bid in equilibrium, a single firm can never gain from with-
holding capacity and asking for a higher price if it is finally not one of the
price setting firms. If it is not price setting and increases the bid on part of
its capacity, it can potentially lose if it is substituted by another firm in the
merit order and is bidding too high on part of its capacity to be necessary to
satisfy demand. If it could gain by becoming price setting, then the situation
is not an equilibrium to begin with because then it could also gain by bidding
a higher price on its total capacity. If in the equilibrium the firm is a price
setting marginal firm , then it does not matter whether it bids that marginal
market clearing price on all its capacity and is rationed or on only part of its
fulfill the obligation, providing capacities would cause a cost because the firm would be
punished by the NYISO.
13The Model is the same as in Moreno and Ubeda (2006) and Ubeda (2004) only with
a more specified linear demand and, for now, without any possibility to invest in capacity.
14In the case of multiple marginal bidders we assume that they are rationed according to
their relative share in the total capacity bid at the marginal price by the marginal bidders.
15See also Fabra et al. (2006) who prove this in their Lemma 2 for 2 competing firms
and Schwenen (2012) who makes the intuitive argument presented here in a more formal
way for n > 2 firms.
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capacity and is not or less rationed. It is always less profitable to increase
the price on part of the capacity such that another firm substitutes for that
part of the capacity in the merit order than demanding just slightly less than
that potentially substituting firm on one’s total capacity.
When characterizing the potential market equilibria which depend on the
capacities held by the firms it is worthwhile as in Moreno and Ubeda (2006)
to split the firms according to their capacities in those who can potentially
be price setting or marginal in an equilibrium and those who cannot. For
the start define the two sets of firms
Q = {j ∈ N |K¯−j < α} and O = {j ∈ N |K¯−j ≥ α}. (2)
Proposition 1 The firms j ∈ O can only set the marginal price in a Nash
equilibrium if Q = ∅ and the equilibrium price is p = bj = 0. If Q 6= ∅ then
the price in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium needs to be strictly larger than
the marginal costs of zero.
Proof. Suppose j ∈ O and bj > 0 is the equilibrium price. This is only
possible if the bids of all the other firms i ∈ N , i 6= j, satisfy bi ≥ bj. However,
then firm i has an incentive to undercut firm j slightly in a Bertrand fashion
in order to increase its profit, no matter whether i ∈ O or i ∈ Q. If on the
other hand j ∈ O and bj = 0 then p = bj = 0 cannot be an equilibrium
price if there are still firms i ∈ Q. These firms always have an incentive by
unilaterally bidding α > bi > bj = 0 to increase the price to bi and, thus,
increase their profit. This argument would not change if the low bidding firm
with bj = 0 belonged to the set Q instead. 
Not surprisingly, firms, whose capacity is so small that their capacity is not
even needed to supply total demand at a price of zero (j ∈ O), can never
be price setters in equilibrium as long as other firms have capacities large
enough that they are necessary to satisfy demand at a price of zero.
Let us assume for the rest of the analysis that the firms’ capacities are
such that Q 6= ∅, implying
K¯ ≥ Kj > K¯ − α for some j ∈ N. (3)
The residual demand of firm j ∈ Q
Dr(p, K¯−j) = max{α− K¯−j − βp, 0}
9
is the demand left to firm j if all other firms in the market offer their total
capacities and if demand would be efficiently rationed. For firm j’s residual
demand firm j’s monopoly price is
pj = arg max{pDr(p, K¯−j)} = α− K¯−j
2β
. (4)
The price pj is only feasible as an equilibrium price if D
r(pj, K¯−j) < Kj or
Kj > α− K¯. (5)
If for none of the firms j ∈ Q condition (5) holds, the only feasible equilibrium
price is
p¯ =
{
p|D(p) = K¯} = α− K¯
β
. (6)
The following proposition characterizes the potential Nash equilibria in the
multi-unit-uniform-price auction.
Proposition 2 If Q 6= ∅ then depending on the capacities of the firms j ∈ Q
we can distinguish between two different cases.
(i) If Kj ≤ α−K¯ for all j ∈ Q, there are infinitely many bidding equilibria
in pure strategies where each firm j ∈ N bids bj ≤ p¯. The equilibrium
price is p = p¯ regardless of the firms bids and all firms j in N sell their
total capacity Kj.
(ii) If Kj > α− K¯ for some j ∈ Q there are potentially multiple equilibria
in pure strategies where one of the firms j ∈ P with
P = {j ∈ Q|Kj ≥ (α− K¯)
2 +K21
2K1
} (7)
bids bj = pj as defined in (4) and sells potentially only part of its
capacity necessary to satisfy the residual demand Dr(pj, K¯−j). All other
firms i ∈ N \ j bid bi ≤ bj with
bj =
(α− K¯ +Kj)2
4βKj
< pj = bj (8)
and sell their total capacity Ki. The equilibrium price is identical with
the bid bj = pj = p of the highest bidding firm j.
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Figure 1: Characterization of Potentially Price Setting Firms with K¯ < α
Proof. See the argument in Appendix A. 
Proposition 2 implies that if all firms j ∈ Q have a rather small capacity
with Kj ≤ α − K¯, then the equilibrium price is always determined by the
balance of total available capacity and the demand for capacity and is given
by p¯ as defined in (6).16 If some firms j ∈ Q are larger with Kj > α − K¯,
the firm with the largest capacity, firm 1 would then necessarily belong to P
as defined in (7), meaning it could potentially be a price setting firm with
b1 = p1 = p. However, whether firm 1 is the only possible price setting firm
depends on the capacities of the other firms j ∈ Q. Given K1 > α − K¯ and
therefore also 1 ∈ P , two different situations characterized in figure 1 and 2
can occur.
Suppose K¯ < α then all firms j ∈ N also belong to Q and O = ∅. Note
that if 0 < K¯ < α
2
we necessarily have α − K¯ > α
2
> K1 and neither firm
1 nor any other firm j with Kj < K1 can be an element in P , and be price
setting in equilibrium. This situation is sketched on the left-hand side of
figure 1. With K¯ < α and K1 ≥ Kj with j 6= 1 only those combinations of
K1 and Kj can occur which lie to the east of the upward sloping and to the
16In Figure 1 this is the case as soon as K1 ≤ α − K¯ which necessarily implies Kj ≤
K1 ≤ α for all j ∈ Q.
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α
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P
K¯ − α
K¯ − α
2α < K¯
p = pj
p = p1
p = 0
p = p1 -
j
p = 0
Figure 2: Characterization of Potentially Price Setting Firms with α ≤ K¯
west of the downward sloping dashed 45o-degree line. Thus, P = ∅ and the
equilibrium price is necessarily p = p¯. If α
2
< K¯ < α then firm 1 can be a
price setter in equilibrium, given K1 > α − K¯, and 1 ∈ P . Whether other
firms j ∈ Q could also be price setters depends on their capacity relative to
the capacity of firm 1. If their smaller capacity is relative close to firm 1’s
such that j ∈ P , they can also be price setting firms and we could potentially
also observe p = pj as market equilibria. On the right-hand side in figure
1 all potentially price setting firms j with Kj ≤ K1 must have a capacity
Kj above the bold curve, but since K¯ < α also implies K1 + Kj ≤ K¯ < α
these firms capacities cannot be to the west of the dashed downward sloping
45o-line.
Now suppose α ≤ K¯ < 2α, then not all firms are necessarily an element
of Q. If Q = ∅ this implies a relative even distribution of all capacities and
proposition 1 applies with the equilibrium price being p = 0. However, if
Q 6= ∅, then firm 1 ∈ Q and firm 1 ∈ P necessarily holds which means, firm
1 can be a price setter with p = p1. In addition all those firms j ∈ Q with a
capacity Kj ≤ K1 such that it exceeds the bold curved line on the left-hand
side of figure 2 can also be price setters which would result in an equilibrium
price of p = pj. Note that as soon as K1 > α holds, no other firm j 6= 1
can be an element of Q and therefore P because necessarily K−j > α and
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the equilibrium price can only be either p = p1 if K1 > K¯ − α, or p = 0
if K1 ≤ K¯ − α and proposition 1 applies. These are the only two possible
prices for K¯ > 2α, the case illustrated on the right-hand side of figure 2.
Obviously, the potential market prices and highest potential bids in the
market depend, on the one hand, on the level of the total capacity but,
on the other hand, also on how unequally distributed the capacities of the
different generators are. The following corollary characterizes the upper and
lower limit of the market price and results mainly from proposition 1, the
definition of P in equation (7) of proposition 2 and the definition of the the
market price, given in equation (4).
Corollary 1 Observed market prices depend on the total capacity and on the
inequality of the capacities in the following way.
(i) For 0 ≤ K¯ < α
2
the market price observed should satisfy
p =
α− K¯
β
= p¯.
(ii) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α the market prices observed should satisfy
p =
α− K¯
β
for K1 < α− K¯ and
p ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
,
α− K¯ +K1
2β
]
otherwise.
(iii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α the market prices observed should satisfy
p = 0 for K1 < K¯ − α,
p ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
,
α− K¯ +K1
2β
]
for K¯ − α ≤ K1 < α and
p =
α− K¯ +K1
2β
otherwise.
(iv) For 2α ≤ K¯ the market prices observed should satisfy
p = 0 for K1 < K¯ − α and
p =
α− K¯ +K1
2β
otherwise.
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Corollary 2 characterizes the non-marginal bids and follows from applying
proposition 1 and the definition of P , given in equation (7), to the upper
limit of the non-marginal bids, given in equation (8) of proposition 2.
Corollary 2 The non-marginal bids in equilibrium need to satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions.
(i) For 0 ≤ K¯ < α
2
all bids can be non-marginal and need to satisfy
bj ≤ α− K¯
β
for all j ∈ N.
(ii) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α again all bids need to satisfy
bj ≤ α− K¯
β
for K1 < α− K¯.
The non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ b with b ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)4
8βK1[(α− K¯)2 +K21 ]
,
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
]
otherwise.
(iii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α all bids are marginal and must satisfy
bj = 0 for all j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
The non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ bj with bj ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)4
8βK1[(α− K¯)2 +K21 ]
,
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
]
if K¯−α ≤ K1 < α
and bi ≤ (α− K¯ +K1)
2
4βK1
= b1 otherwise.
(iv) For 2α ≤ K¯ again all bids are marginal and must satisfy
bj = 0 for j ∈ N and K1 < K¯ − α.
For K1 ≥ K¯ − α the non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ (α− K¯ +K1)
2
4βK1
.
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4 The Effect of Price Regulations on Market
Outcomes
This section analyzes how different types of price regulations changes the
market outcomes. First it focusses on maximum prices in the form of bid
caps and later on price floors or minimum bids. In both cases the analysis
starts with either general bid caps or general bid floors which apply to all
firms in the market. Afterwards the focus shifts to selective price regulations,
meaning bid caps only for firms with large capacities and bid floors only for
firms with low capacities. The NYICAP market which inspired this study
has general and selectively more stringent bid caps, but only selective and
no general bid floors.17
4.1 The Effect of Maximum Prices
4.1.1 General Bid Caps
Obviously, a general bid cap can only have an effect if it forces at least some
firms to change their bidding behaviour. From proposition 1 we know that
if Q = ∅ then all firms j ∈ O = N bid bj = 0 and the equilibrium price is
p = 0. This bidding behaviour would not be changed by any bid cap that
forces all firms j ∈ N to bid bj ≤ bˆ with bˆ ≥ 0. This obviously changes if
Q 6= ∅ and proposition 2 would apply if there were no bid cap.
If Kj ≤ α − K¯ for all firms j ∈ Q then the bid cap might change the
bidding behaviour if bˆ < p¯ where the latter is the price, defined in equation
(6), where total capacity balances with total capacity demand. It would
however not change the market price because total supply and total demand
cannot be balanced at any price p = bˆ < p¯. The auctioneer needs to elevate
the market price from the potentially highest bid bˆ to p = p¯ to balance total
supply and demand. The same is true if some firms j ∈ Q have a capacity
with Kj > α−K¯ but the bid cap is still set such that bˆ < p¯ then all firms bid
at or below the threshold bˆ, but the final market price will always be p = p¯.
Proposition 3 If Q = ∅ and all firms j ∈ N also satisfy j ∈ O, then a bid
cap bˆ ≥ 0 which only allows the firms to bid a price bj ≤ bˆ for their total
capacity, does not change the firms’ bidding behaviour. All firms j ∈ N still
17See section 2 for more details on this.
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bid bj = 0 and thus the market price is still p = bj = 0. If Q 6= ∅ and bˆ ≤ p¯
the bid cap might reduce the bid of some bidders j ∈ Q, and it will always
result in a market price of p = p¯ as defined in (6).
Proof. See the arguments above.
If Kj > α − K¯ for some j ∈ Q then a bid cap with bˆ > p¯ does not only
have potential to change the bidding behaviour but also to change the market
outcome. For having an effect on the bidding behaviour and this way also
on the market price it is necessary that the bid cap is either below the bid
of the marginal bidder or changes the set of potentially marginal bidders P
as given in (7) in proposition 2.
Proposition 4 If Q 6= ∅, if some firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj > α − K¯
and if the bid cap satisfies bˆ > p¯ then the bid cap has only an impact on the
bidding behavior of the firms if it constrains the potential bids of some firms
j ∈ Q meaning pj > bˆ⇔ Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯).
(i) If Kj > 2βbˆ− (α − K¯) holds for all firms j ∈ Q then there is a set of
Nash equilibria where any of the firms j ∈ Q with Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯)
bids bj = bˆ and all other firms i ∈ N \ j set bi ≤ bˆj with
bˆj =
bˆ(α +Kj − K¯ − βbˆ)
Kj
< bj, (9)
and with bj defined in equation (8). The market price will be p = bˆ.
(ii) If only for some firms j ∈ Q the condition Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) holds,
the equilibria described in (i) still exist, but in addition other Nash
equilibria can exist. In these additional equilibria one of the other firms
j ∈ Q with Kj ≤ 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) bids its monopoly price on the residual
demand bj = pj < bˆ and all the other firms i ∈ N \ j bid bi ≤ bj. These
equilibria exist if j ∈ Pˆ with
Pˆ =
{
j ∈ Q|Kj ≥ 2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯)−K1(α− K¯)
K1
}
. (10)
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(iii) If for all firms j ∈ Q the condition Kj ≤ 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) holds, then the
bid cap has no effect on the firms bidding behaviour in equilibrium and
proposition 2 still applies.
Proof. See the the proof in Appendix B.
Note that the threshold that the capacity of an unconstrained firm j needs to
exceed (meaning Kj > 2βbˆ− (α−K¯)) in order to be potentially price setting
in case (ii) (j ∈ Pˆ ) is lower than the threshold that defined whether firm
j could be a price setter without the bid cap (j ∈ P defined in proposition
2). This results from other firms i ∈ Q with Ki > Kj finding it now less
attractive to overbid firm j because they are restrained to the bid cap and can
no longer bid the monopoly price on their residual demand because pi > bˆ.
Therefore firms j ∈ Q with smaller capacities as before can be price setters
in an equilibrium and, if they are, smaller equilibrium prices than without
the price cap occur.
With K1 > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) and p1 > bˆ > p¯ firm 1 with the largest
capacity is potentially constrained by the bid cap, but this also implies that
K1 > α− K¯. The latter excludes the case that 0 < K¯ < α2 or case (i) as well
as part of case (ii) from corollary 1. Corollary 3 characterizes the market
prices that we can observe in this case.
Corollary 3 If Q 6= ∅ and K1 ≤ 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) then a bid cap bˆ > p¯ should
not change the observed prices in the market as characterized in corollary 1.
If, however, Q 6= ∅ and K1 > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) then a bid cap bˆ > p¯ changes
the observed market prices in the following way.
(i) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α the market prices observed should satisfy
p ∈
[
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
, bˆ
]
.
(ii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α the market prices observed should satisfy
p = 0 for K1 < K¯ − α,
p ∈
[
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
, bˆ
]
for K¯ − α ≤ K1 < α and
p = bˆ otherwise.
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(iii) For 2α ≤ K¯ the market prices observed should satisfy
p = 0 for K1 < K¯ − α and
p = bˆ otherwise.
So, the bid cap does not only potentially reduce the upper limit of the equi-
librium prices, but also reduces the lower limit even if the lower limit does
not exceed the bid cap.
Since the threshold for non-marginal bids bˆj, given in (9), is monotonously
increasing in the capacity Kj of the price setting firm j (∂bˆj/(∂Kj) > 0) and
now smaller firms can also be price setting the bid cap can also have an effect
on the marginal bids, again without them exceeding the bid cap.
Corollary 4 Given Q 6= ∅ and K1 > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) then a bid cap bˆ > p¯
results in the following observed non-marginal bids.
(i) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α the non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ bˆj with bˆj ∈
[
β2bˆ[2(α− K¯ − βbˆ) +K1]
2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯)−K1(α− K¯)
,
bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
]
.
(ii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α the bids must satisfy
bj = 0 for all j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
The non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ bˆj with bˆj ∈
[
β2bˆ[2(α− K¯ − βbˆ) +K1]
2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯)−K1(α− K¯)
,
bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
]
if K¯ − α ≤ K1 < α and
bi ≤ bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
= bˆ1 otherwise.
(iii) For 2α ≤ K¯ the bids must satisfy
bj = 0 for all j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
The non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
= bˆ1 otherwise.
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4.1.2 Selective Bid Caps
Now, what happens if the bid cap is only selectively applied to firms with
Kj > Kˆ > 0 instead of to all firms participating in the auction?
18 Note that,
if the bid cap bˆ applies only to firms with Kj > Kˆ with Kˆ < K¯ − α , this
would not change our results because this would mean it would still apply to
all potentially price setting firms j ∈ Q. Thus, all our results summarized in
proposition 3 and 4 as well as in corollary 3 and 4 would still hold.
Note also that only those firms with Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) are potentially
constrained in their price setting behaviour by a bid cap bˆ > α−K¯
β
= p¯
because the constraint would not influence the behaviour of the firms j with
Kˆ ≤ Kj ≤ 2βbˆ − (α − K¯). This implies that if Kˆ ≤ 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) holds,
then again nothing would change compared to the situation characterized in
proposition 3 and 4 as well as in corollary 3 and 4.
Changes can only occur if Kˆ > 2βbˆ + K¯ − α holds, meaning that not
all firms with Kj > 2βbˆ− (α − K¯) will be constrained in their price setting
behaviour. Firms with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) can, on the one hand, still
bid their monopoly price on the residual demand, although pj > bˆ holds, and,
on the other hand, their overbidding option, in case a firm with a smaller
capacity places the highest bid, is still to set bj = pj > bˆ. The following
proposition takes this into account.
Proposition 5 Suppose Q 6= ∅ and that a bid cap bˆ > p¯, defined in (6), is
imposed only on firms j ∈ N with a capacity Kj > Kˆ.
(i) This would not change the market equilibrium compared to proposition
4 if either Kˆ < 2βbˆ + K¯ − α or if all the firms j ∈ Q have a capacity
Kj > Kˆ.
(ii) If there are, however, firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ− (α − K¯) and
at least firm 1 is constrained with K1 > Kˆ > 2βbˆ− (α − K¯), then the
equilibria with firm j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ bidding bˆ and all the other firms
i ∈ N \ j bidding bi ≤ bˆj defined in (9) can still exist if there does not
exist any other firm i with Ki ∈ (2βbˆ+K¯−α+2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α), Kˆ).
18Note that in the NYICAP market Kˆ is determined such that Kˆ = K¯−K˜ > K¯−α with
K˜ ∈ (0, α) being the reference quantity. The firms with Kj > Kˆ = K¯−K˜ cannot bid their
capacity at a higher price than the reference price that satisfies K˜ = α− βbˆ⇔ bˆ = α−K˜β .
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In addition equilibria with firm j ∈ Q with 2βbˆ + K¯ − α < Kj < Kˆ
bidding its monopoly price on its residual demand pj > bˆ and all other
firms i ∈ N \ j bidding bi ≤ bj defined in (8) exist if
Kj ≥ K
2
i + (α− K¯)2
2Ki
for all Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ). (11)
Equilibria with firm j ∈ Q with Kj ∈ [max{K¯ − a, 0}, 2βbˆ + K¯ − α]
bidding its monopoly price on its residual demand pj ≤ bˆ and all other
firms i ∈ N \ j bidding bi ≤ bj can also exist if firm j’s capacity
satisfies not only condition (11) but also Kj ∈ Pˆ as defined in (10) of
proposition 4.
(iii) If K1 < 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) then the selective bid cap does not have any in-
fluence on the equilibrium behaviour of any of the firms and proposition
2 still applies.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Note that proposition 5 differs only in case (ii) from proposition 4. This
has three major implications for the potential equilibrium. First, equilibria
where the firms with the largest capacities bid the bid cap do not always
exist even if Kj > Kˆ for some Kj ∈ Q. If there are firms i ∈ Q with
Ki ∈ (2βbˆ + K¯ − α + 2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α), Kˆ) these firms would have an
incentive to overbid any firm j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ that would bid bj = bˆ.
Second, prices above the bid cap can occur in equilibrium if there are firms
j ∈ Q with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ−(α−K¯). They can be price setters in equilibrium
with p = pj > bˆ given that condition (11) holds for all larger firms i which
are not covered by the selective bid cap. Note that condition (11) is not
a pure subset of P defined in (7) of proposition 2 because it includes also
firms j 6∈ P with smaller capacities since Ki < Kˆ < K1 holds. Third, prices
below the bid cap might occur in equilibrium if, for some firms j ∈ Q with
Kj ≤ 2βbˆ + K¯ − α, both conditions, (11) and Kj ∈ Pˆ , are satisfied. These
two conditions ensure that neither the larger constrained firms i ∈ Q with
Ki > Kˆ nor the larger non constrained firms with Ki ≤ Kˆ want to overbid
firm j. Which of the two constraints is binding depends on the level of the
bid cap bˆ and the critical capacity level Kˆ above which firms are constrained.
Corollary 5 resembles corollary 1 and 3 and identifies the boundaries for
the equilibrium prices.
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Corollary 5 Given Q 6= ∅ and some firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj >
2βbˆ − (α − K¯) then a bid cap bˆ > p¯ only applied to firms j ∈ Q with Kj >
Kˆ > 2βbˆ− (α−K¯) results in the same observed market prices as in corollary
3 if there are no firms j with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯). If, however, such
firms exist and if at least K1 > Kˆ holds, the boundaries for the market price
change in the following way.
(i) For α
2
≤ K¯ < 2α the market prices observed should satisfy
p ∈
[
max
{
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
,
(α− K¯ + Kˆ)2
4βKˆ
}
,
α− K¯ + Kˆ
2β
]
.
(ii) For 2α ≤ K¯ the market prices observed should satisfy
p ∈
[
max
{
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
,
(α− K¯ + Kˆ)2
4βKˆ
}
,
α− K¯ + Kˆ
2β
]
for K¯ − α ≤ Kˆ < α and p = α− K¯ + Kˆ
2β
if Kˆ > α.
If K1 ≤ Kˆ holds, then corollary 1 still applies.
Since bˆ < α−K¯+Kˆ
2β
< α−K¯+K1
2β
holds, it is possible to see a market price above
the bid cap in the market, but it is strictly below the potential upper level in
the case without any bid cap described in corollary 1. Given the restrictions
K1 > α, Kˆ > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) and bˆ > p¯, p = 0 cannot be an equilibrium any
more. In addition p = α−K¯+Kˆ
2β
can only be a unique equilibrium outcome if
K¯ ≥ 2α because otherwise K1 and Kˆ cannot both exceed α.
4.2 The Effect of Price Floors
A general bid floor that is set at bf > 0 forces all firms j ∈ N to bid a price for
their capacity that satisfies bj ≥ bf . Obviously this destroys the equilibrium
that we have identified in proposition 1 for the case that Q = ∅ in which all
firms j ∈ N bid bj = 0 and the equilibrium price would be p = 0. However
this is also the least likely case where bid floors are introduced because in
this case none of the firms, even the largest, is necessary to supply even the
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maximum possible demand for capacity which implies K1 ≤ K¯ − α and it is
hard to understand why a capacity market even exists.
Therefore let us now concentrate on the case K1 > K¯ − α which ensures
that without bid floors proposition 2 applies and the market outcome entails
market power. If we first consider the case where Kj ≤ α − K¯ holds for
all j ∈ Q, then a bid floor with bf ≤ p¯ might destroy some of the potential
equilibria with bj < bf of the unrestricted case, but would not change the
outcome in equilibrium. The equilibrium price is still p = p¯ determined
by the auctioneer to balance demand with the totally available supply. Of
course, if bf > p¯ holds, the market can never be balanced and all equilibria
described in proposition 2 (i) would be destroyed, but again this does not
seem to be a relevant scenario.
So, the case, where the price floor requesting bj ≥ bf really matters and
might also be relevant, is where K1 > α − K¯ and where the bid floor is
chosen such that some of the equilibria described in proposition 2 (ii) would
be destroyed because some price setting firms j ∈ P with bj > bf have now
an incentive to undercut the inframarginal bids which satisfy now necessarily
bi ≥ bf > bj. Note that the limit for non-marginal bids in any equilibrium is
bi ≤ bj, defined in proposition 2 in equation (8), and that this limit increases
with the capacity of the price setting firm j ∈ P because
∂bj
∂Kj
=
K2j − (α− K¯)2
4βK2j
> 0
holds if Kj ∈ Q and Kj > α − K¯. Thus, a bid floor potentially destroys
the equilibria with smaller equilibrium prices where smaller firms are price
setting. A bid cap might even destroy all equilibria described in 2 (ii) if it is
chosen such that bf > b1.
Proposition 6 If K1 > α − K¯, implementing a general bid floor which
applies to all firm j ∈ N , destroys some pure strategy equilibria described in
Proposition 2 (ii), if bf > bj for some firms j ∈ P with bj defined in equation
(8). In the extreme case where bf > b1 holds with
b1 =
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
,
the pure strategy equilibria described in Proposition 2 (ii) disappear. How-
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ever, as long as bj < bf ≤ c¯j holds
c¯j ≡ α
2β
−
√
(K¯ −Kj)Kj(K¯Kj − (α− K¯)2)
2βKj
< pj,
new alternative pure strategy equilibria exist. In these equilibria all firms i
but one firm j ∈ P with c¯j ≥ bf > bj bid at the bid floor bi = bf and firm j
bids at its monopoly price on its residual demand bj = pj defined in equation
(4). If c¯1 < bf holds all firms bidding bf is the unique equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proof. See the arguments above for the destruction of the pure strategy
equilibria from proposition 2 (ii). For the alternative pure strategy equilibria
in case of bf > b1, note that if all firms bid at the bid floor each firm achieves
a profit of
bf
Kj(α− βbf )
K¯
.
If firm j bids its monopoly profit on its residual demand the profit is
(α− K¯ +Kj)2
4β
.
The former exceeds the latter as long as bf ≤ c¯j holds, meaning that the
price setting firm j does not want to reduce its price to the price floor. The
firms that bid the price floor do not want to overbid firm j as long as j ∈ P .
If bf > c¯1 holds than even firm 1 with the largest overbidding profit prefers
to bid at the price floor instead of bidding its monopoly price on the residual
demand. Since no firm wants to overbid if all firms i set bi = bf and no
firm can underbid, this is an equilibrium in pure strategies. Other bidding
equilibria in pure strategies with bi = b > bf do not exist because each firm
has an incentive to underbid in order to sell its total capacity instead of a
rationed share. 
Selective bid floors have the same effect as general ones as long as b1 >
bf > bj for some j ∈ P . They destroy some of the possible equilibria and
make some lower equilibrium prices impossible. In the extreme case of bf > b1
, however, the selective price floor that does not apply to all firms in the
market eradicates the pure strategy equilibria where all firms but at most one
bid on the price floor. These equilibria disappear because with selective bid
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floors applied only to smaller firms in the market the potential price setting
firms j ∈ P for whom bj < bf ≤ c¯1 and Kj > K˘ holds, are excluded from the
bid floor and have an incentive to underbid the firms i with Ki < K˘ to whom
the price floor applies and who therefore need to obey bi ≥ bf > underlinebj.
Proposition 7 If K1 > α− K¯, implementing a bid floor only to those firms
j ∈ N for which Kj < K˘ < K1 destroys again some pure strategy equilibria
described in Proposition 2 (ii), if bf > bj for some firms j ∈ P with bj defined
in equation (8). In the extreme case where bf > b1 holds with
b1 =
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
,
all pure strategy equilibria described in Proposition 2 (ii) disappear. The
alternative equilibria in pure strategies where all firms bid at the price floor
but at most one larger firm do no longer exist as long as the price floor does
not also apply to the price setting firm j.
Proof. See the arguments above. 
5 Conclusions
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the reduction of selective bid caps in
the NYICAP in 2008 should have reduced the upper limit of the range of
observed equilibrium prices but not necessarily to the level of the selective bid
caps. The same should hold for the inframarginal bids. At the same point
in time the newly introduced selective price floors should have increased
the lower level of the observed equilibrium prices in the auction, even if
these lower limits lied way above the introduced price floors without them.
Trivially there will be more inframarginal bids above the selective price floor.
So, both changes together should have compressed the observed equilib-
rium prices from both sides and, chosen adequately, should have reduced the
deviations from the targeted reference price. Whether the expected revenues
from the capacity market were increased or reduced depends on the chosen
bid caps and bid floors, but taken together it is not clear from the outset
whether the incentive to invest in new electricity capacity increased or de-
creased. The only effect of the reform could have been that the regulators
more often than not hit the reference price.
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Of course our model can also be applied to other multi-unit uniform price
auctions. Theoretically it is known that these auctions are not necessarily
efficient (see for example Ausubel et al. (2014)) and that reservation prices
which are in our selling context equivalent to price caps can improve on
the efficiency (see Bresky (2013)). In reality reservation prices are rarely
used in treasury auctions although there is evidence for underpricing (see
Kremer and Nyborg (2004) and Keloharyu et al. (2005)) and it seems clear
not only from the analysis here that the prices of treasury bonds could be
increased by using them. Betz et al. (2010) report that reserve prices are
relatively common in emission permit auctions, meaning that here regulation
authorities use a reserve price to ensure a sufficiently high price. I have not
found evidence, yet, for too high prices in these auctions. If they existed,
they could be fought by price caps which are in these buying auctions the
equivalent to our price floors.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
A.1 Characterization of the Nash Equilibria for Less
Capacity Constrained Firms
Assume Q 6= ∅ and consider first the case with Kj > α− K¯ for some j ∈ Q.
This implies that these firms can potentially bid their monopoly price on
the residual demand pj and be price setting with bj = pj = p because it is
feasible. Note that pj > pi if Kj > Ki. Firm j bidding bj = pj = p and all
other firms bidding lower can only be a Nash equilibrium if no low bidding
firm wants to overbid and firm j does not want to underbid the second
highest bid. Let us first consider overbidding by other firms. If Ki < Kj
then optimally overbidding bj = pj implies bi = pj + ε with ε → 0 and a
profit of pjD
r(pj, K−i) because pi < pj. One can show that for all i > j the
profit from overbidding is smaller than the profit from either underbidding
or matching bj = pj if Kj > α − K¯. Now suppose Ki > Kj > α − K¯ then
the optimal overbidding strategy for firm i would be to bid bi = pi. However,
firm i only wants to overbid firm j with bj = pj if the profit from doing
so is higher than matching or underbidding firm j. Note that matching is
always weakly dominated by undercutting. So firm i only has an incentive
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to overbid if
piD
r(pi, K−i) > pjKi ⇔ Kj < (α− K¯)
2 +K2i
2Ki
.
This implies that bj = pj = p and all other firms bidding lower can only
be an equilibrium strategy if the condition above holds for none of the firms
with Ki > Kj. Since the right hand side of this inequality increases in Ki
for Ki > Kj > α− K¯, this is ensured if it holds for the firm with the highest
capacity K1, meaning (7) holds. Now let us check under which condition
underbidding the second lowest bid by firm j is more profitable for firm j.
Suppose bi < bj = pj is the second highest bid. Firm j is only tempted to
undercut if
biKj > pjD
r(pj, K−j)⇔ bi > (α− K¯ +Kj)
2
4βKj
.
Thus, if (8) holds firm j does not have an incentive to undercut and the
equilibria characterised in proposition 2 do exist for Kj > α− K¯.
A.2 Characterization of the Nash Equilibria for More
Capacity Constrained Firms
Assume again that Q 6= ∅, but consider now the case with Kj ≤ α−K¯ for all
j ∈ Q. Then for all the potentially price setting firms j ∈ Q the monopoly
price on their specific residual demand is smaller than the price that balances
total capacity with total demand, meaning pj ≤ p¯. Suppose now that firm
i ∈ N bids the highest price bi ≥ bj for all j ∈ N with j 6= i for its capacity
Ki. As long as bi ≤ p¯ the equilibrium price would be p¯ because the auctioneer
needs to increase the price from bi to p¯ in order to balance supply and demand
and firm i would sell all its capacity Ki at the price p = p¯. None of the other
firms j 6= i would like to overbid firm i. For all p¯ ≥ bj > bi the auction price
would not change and any firm j would still sell its total capacity at p = p¯,
whereas firm j would lose profits as soon as it sets bj > p¯ ≥ bi because then
firm j would generate its monopoly profit on its residual demand which is
due to p¯ > pj monotonously decreasing for all p = bj > p¯ > pj. In addition
firm i with bi ≤ p¯ has neither an incentive to underbid any of its competitors
nor to increase its bid bi > p¯. In the first case nothing would change for firm
i. It would still sell its total capacity at a price of p = p¯. In the second case
26
firm i would also decrease its profits because of the same argument made
before for an overbidding firm j. Thus, there are infinitely many equilibria
in pure strategies where all the firms j ∈ N bid bj ≤ p¯.
B Proof of Proposition 4
Assume again that Q 6= ∅ holds and that Kj < α − K¯ holds for some
j ∈ Q. Assume in addition that the bid cap can potentially have an influence
on the market price because bˆ > α−K¯
β
= p¯. Those firms j for which the
monopoly price on their residual demand exceeds the bid cap pj > bˆ⇔ Kj >
2βbˆ− (α− K¯) can at most bid bˆ and they are willing to do so as long as
bˆDr(bˆ, K−j) ≥ biKj for all i ∈ N \ j.
This implies that all the other firms i ∈ N \ j bid such that bi ≤ bˆ where bˆ is
defined in equation (9) in proposition 4 and b in equation (8) in proposition
2.
Note that overbidding is not an option for all firms i ∈ N \j and matching
the bid bj = bˆ would clearly reduce their profits. Thus, for all firms j ∈ Q
with Kj > 2bbˆ−(a−K¯) bidding bˆ and all other firms i ∈ N \j bidding bi ≤ bˆ
are Nash equilibria. Now assume that the firm j ∈ Q with Kj ≤ 2βbˆ−(α−K¯)
sets its monopoly price pj on the residual demand. As long as there are no
other firms i ∈ N \ j for which the bid cap could potentially bind, meaning
Ki ≤ 2βbˆ−(α−K¯) for all i ∈ N \j the bid cap has no impact and proposition
2 still applies. However if there are other firms i withKi > 2βbˆ−(α−K¯) ≥ Kj
then firm j bidding pj and all other firms i ∈ N \j bidding bi < pj can only be
part of a Nash equilibrium if none of the firms with Ki > 2βbˆ−(α−K¯) ≥ Kj
has an incentive to overbid with bi = bˆ meaning
bˆDr(bˆ, K−i) ≤ pjKi ⇔ Kj ≥ 2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+Ki − K¯)−Ki(α− K¯)
Ki
.
When taking into account that the condition above needs to hold for all firms
with Ki > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) ≥ Kj and that the right-hand side of the condition
increases in Ki it becomes obvious that it must be satisfied for the largest
potentially restrained bidder Ki = K1 > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) ≥ Kj for the Nash
equilibrium with bj = pj and bi ≤ b to exist for Ki > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) ≥ Kj
which implies (10), given in proposition 4.
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C Proof of proposition 5
If Kˆ < 2βbˆ+ K¯ −α then the bid constraint bˆ does not constrain a firm with
capacity Ki = Kˆ because its monopoly price on the residual demand pi does
not exceed bˆ but potentially some of the firms j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ. On
the other hand if all the firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj > Kˆ all of them
are potentially constrained. In both cases the selective bid cap has the same
effect as if it would not have been tied to the condition that Kj ≥ Kˆ and
proposition 4 would still apply.
If there are, however, firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) and at
least K1 > Kˆ then these firms j are not constrained by the bid cap, although
they would be if bˆ would not have been applied only selectively. These firms
can still bid bj = pj whereas at least firm 1 is constrained and can only bid
b1 ≤ bˆ < p1.
Of course all the firms j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ can still be price setting in
equilibrium if
bˆDr(bˆ, K¯−j) ≥ biKj for all i ∈ N \ j ⇔ bi ≤ bˆj
with bˆj defined in (9) and none of the firms i ∈ Q with Ki ∈ (2βbˆ+K¯−α, Kˆ)
wants to overbid firm j by bidding bi = pi > bˆ.
19 The latter holds true if
bˆKi ≥ piDr(pi, K−i) ⇔ Ki ≤ 2βbˆ+ K¯ − α + 2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α) (12)
for all i with Ki ∈ (2βbˆ+ K¯ − α, Kˆ).
Thus if (12) holds, the equilibria where any of the firms j with Kj > Kˆ is
bidding bˆ and all the other firms i ∈ N \ j bid bi ≤ bˆj still exists. Note that
with Kˆ ≤ 2βbˆ + K¯ − α + 2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α) condition (12) is necessarily
satisfied.
In addition the unconstrained firms j with Kj ∈ (2βbˆ − (α − K¯), Kˆ)
could bid bj = pj > bˆ and be price setting. This could only be an equilibrium
if firm j could not generate more profits by undercutting another firm i’s
bid bi, meaning all other firms need to bid bi ≤ bj which is defined in (8).
At the same point in time no other firm i with Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ), should be
19Note that the firms i ∈ Q with Ki 6∈ (2βbˆ+ K¯ − α, Kˆ) do not want to overbid bj = bˆ
because pi < bˆ.
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tempted to overbid firm j with bi = pi.
20 Thus, bj = pj for firm j ∈ Q with
Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) and bi ≤ bj for all i ∈ N \ j can only be an
equilibrium if
pjKi ≥ piDr(pi, K−i)⇔ Kj ≥ K
2
i + (α− K¯)2
2Ki
for all Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ). (13)
Note that the latter inequality is increasing on the right-hand side in Ki and
is necessarily satisfied if Kj >
Kˆ2+(α−K¯)2
2Kˆ
.
Also firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) ≥ Kj can potentially be
price setting and bid bj = pj ≤ bˆ in equilibrium. In this case the other firms
i ∈ N \ j need to bid again bi ≤ bj < pj. However, now all firms i ∈ Q
with K1 ≥ Ki > Kj could potentially overbid firm j with either bi = bˆ if
Ki ∈ [Kˆ,K1] or with bi = pi if Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ). In an equilibrium they should
not have an incentive to do so. The latter implies not only that(13) needs to
hold but also
pjKi ≥ bˆDr(bˆ, K−i)
⇔ Kj ≥ 2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+Ki − K¯)−Ki(α− K¯)
Ki
for all Ki ∈ [Kˆ,K1].
This restriction is again increasing in Ki and is therefore equivalent with
Kj ∈ Pˆ as defined in (10).
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